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COMMENTS
INSURANCE-RATE REGULATION-COMPETITORS' STANDING

To

SEEK ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF RATE FILINGS-On August 6,
1958, the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, headed by Senator O'Mahoney, began its investigation of the manner in which the states have regulated the business of insurance.1 Subsequently, Senator O'Mahoney stated that the principal objectives of the hearings would
be to determine from industry representatives and state insurance regulatory authorities the extent to which competition2 had
been preserved under the pattern of state regulation which emerged
after the enactment of the McCarran Act. 3 The subcommittee's
investigation had been initiated by reports of concerted action
by the dominant elements in the insurance industry to prevent
independent companies from competing with the members of
the rating bureaus on a price basis. 4 This concerted action allegedly had taken the form of attempts by rating bureaus and
their affiliated companies to challenge, both on the administrative and judicial level, the efforts of the independent companies
to secure approval of lower rates. 5 The standing of rating bureaus
and their affiliated companies to challenge independent rate filings may present a substantial deterrent to successful price competition by independent companies because of the delays inherent
1 In his opening statement Senator O'Mahoney emphasized that "[t]hese hearings
mark the first step in the Sub-committee's major study of the insurance industry some
thirteen years after the enactment of the McCarran Act. In enacting this legislation
Congress chose to repose the principal regulatory responsibility over the insurance industry
in the various states. However, Congress indicated its intention that competition should
continue to be a prime regulator. The Congress now begins its examination of the
manner in which the states have exercised their stewardship over the business of insurance."
Quoted in Navarre, "Federal Investigation of Insurance," A.B.A. PROC., SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW 13 at 15 (1958).
2 "Competition is the life blood of the free enterprise system. When the McCarran
Act was passed, Congress was, of course, aware that various states had approved the fixing
of rates in concert through rating bureaus. Nevertheless, the legislative history makes it
perfectly clear that Congress intended that competition would continue to act as a prime
regulator in the insurance industry.... Subsequent laws enacted by the States for rate
regulation reaffirmed that policy and specifically provided for variations in rates in several
cases in accordance with this express declaration of policy by Congress." Statement of
Senator O'Mahoney, quoted in THE WEEKLY UNDERWRITER, May 30, 1959, p. 1116:1.
3 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1958) §§1011-1015.
4 See statement of Senator O'Mahoney, S. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary on the Insurance Industry,
86th Cong., 2d sess., p. 1050 (1959) (hereinafter cited Insurance Industry Hearings).
5 See, generally, Statement of John A. Diemand, President of the Insurance Company
of North America, Insurance Industry Hearings, p. 1121; Statement of W. Perry Epes, on
behalf of the Insurance Company of North America, Insurance Industry Hearings, p. 1151.

1960]

COMMENTS

731

in the administrative and judicial process. The purpose of this
comment is to explore, in the light of the All-Industry pattern
of regulation and the applicable public policy considerations,
the right of rating bureaus and their members to such standing
at the administrative level.6

A.

Background of the McCarran Act

The necessity of cooperative action in the promulgation of
insurance rates has long been recognized. Because the actual
cost of insurance cannot be determined in advance, the industry has
resorted to a collective pooling of the loss and expense experience
of individual companies in an effort to secure as broad a statistical
base as possible for the purpose of predicting with the greatest
accuracy the costs applicable to a future period. In this respect,
the substantial progress µiade by the insurance industry since
mid-nineteenth century has been attributable, in part, to the development of the rating bureau which, as a statistical agent for
its member companies, collected and combined their statistical
experience and promulgated a rate structure to which the members had previously agreed to adhere. Since no single company
had sufficient experience of its own, resort to the work product
of a rating bureau was a practical necessity in the establishment
of a rate structure. The threat of expulsion from the bureau for
infractions of its rules served admirably to achieve industry uniformity in prices and coverages, thus allowing little room for independent action. Consequently, the decision in United States
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association1 that the federal government had plenary power to regulate the business of insurance
carried serious implications with regard to the continued existence
of a regulatory scheme which had been characterized primarily
by private industry controls and only infrequently by adequate
state regulation. 8 Furthermore, the applicability to the insurance
6 This comment will be confined to a discussion of the question of standing at the
administrative level. Although the problem of standing at the judicial level is important,
tbe absence of pertinent pre-enactment legislative materials precludes a discussion of
statutory standing at the state level conferred in terms of "aggrieved party" provisions.
However, the policy considerations discussed in Part II of the comment appear equally
applicable to both problems.
7 322 U.S. 533 (1944). For a discussion of the South-Eastern Undenvriters case, see
Powell, "Insurance As Commerce," 57 HAR.v. L. REv. 937 (1944).
s See Kimball and Boyce, "The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The
McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective," 56 MICH. L. REv. 545 at 546-552 (1958).
For a survey of state regulation prior to the South-Eastern Underwriters case, see comment, 33 GEO. L. J. 70 (1944).
·
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business of the Sherman Antitrust Act,9 which had previously
been interpreted as condemning all price-fixing agreements without regard to their reasonableness,10 presaged the end of cooperative rate-making.11
Shortly after the South-Eastern Underwriters decision12 a bill
was introduced in Congress, based on a model bill submitted by
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, which
emerged in an amended form as the McCarran Act.13 The basic
purpose of the act was expressed in section 1:
" ... the Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of
insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any
barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by
the several states."14
o 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1958) §§1-7. The Sherman Act was
intended to afford protection against price manipulations which resulted from monopolies
and combinations in restraint of trade, by declaring illegal all contracts, combinations,
and conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce, and any attempt to monopolize any
part of trade or commerce with or without the use of boycotts, coercion or intimidation.
10 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
11 The seriousness of the situation presented by the South-Eastern Underwriters case
is indicated by the fact that briefs amid curiae for rehearing were submitted by the
attorneys general of 41 states. See Orfield, "Improving State Regulation of Insurance," 32
MINN. L. REv. 219 at 222 (1948).
12 Even while the South-Eastern Undenvriters case was pending before the Supreme
Court the Walter-Bailey-Van Nuys Bill [S. 1362, H.R. 3269, H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st sess.
(1943)), which would have completely exempted the business of insurance from the federal antitrust laws, was introduced in the House. The bill passed the House [90 CONG.
REc. 6565 (1944) ] and was reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee, but died
on the calendar. See comment, 32 GEo. L.J. 66 (1943). One reason for the bill's failure
to pass was a survey conducted by the Department of Justice which revealed that about
one-half of the states in which rating bureaus operated made inadequate provision for the
regulation of insurance companies, leaving the public virtually at the mercy of price-fixing
combinations which were illegal per se under the Sherman Act. See Joint Hearing Before
the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1362, H.R. 3269, and H.R.
3270, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 55-57 (1943).
13 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1958) §§1011-1015. The legislative proposal submitted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners may be found
in PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 32 (1945) [hereinafter cited as N.A.I.C. PRoc.J.
14 Congressional acquiescence in continued state regulation and taxation of the business of insurance has been upheld in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
Cf. comment, 45 CoL. L. REv. 927 (1945). In authorizing the continued control of the
insurance business by the states, rather than devising a federal regulatory scheme, Congress was motivated by two considerations: (I) it feared the chaos that might accompany
disruption of well-established patterns of state regulation and taxation [S. Rep. 20, 79th
Cong., 1st sess. (1945)); and (2) while recognizing that insurance companies doing interstate business were, under the existing scheme of state regulation, required to conform
to the highest standards set by any of the individual states, it doubted whether congressional legislation, influenced by a variety of local pressures, would produce such high
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The act further provided for a three-year moratorium period during which state laws regulating or taxing insurance would not
be invalidated by any Act of Congress, but that after January I,
1948, the federal antitrust laws "shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated
by state law."15
The legislative history of the McCarran Act suggests quite
clearly that Congress, while recognizing the desirability of collaborative rate-making practices,1 6 appreciated the competitive restraints inherent in concerted price-fixing,17 and required as a
condition of exemption from the federal antitrust laws positive
and effective state regulation of the concerted price-fixing activities of rating bureaus.18 Furthermore, Congress indicated its
standards for countrywide operations. See Patterson, "The Future of State Supervision of
Insurance," 23 TEX. L. REv. 18 at 31 (1944).
15 Section 2 (b). 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §1012. The moratorium was later
extended to June 30, 1948 [Public Law No. 238, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 59 Stat. 34 (1947)]
in order to give Congress additional time to determine whether the states had been successful in their efforts to enact effective interstitial legislation. S. Rep. 407, 80th Cong.,
1st sess. (1947). However, section 3 (b) added, "Nothing contained in this Act shall render
said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or
act of boycott, coercion or intimidation." 61 Stat. 448 (1947), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
(1958) §1013. Section 3 (b) has been applied in Sherman Act prosecutions for insurance boycotts. United States v. Insurance Board of Cleveland, (D.C. Ohio 1956)
144 F. Supp. 684; United States v. New Orleans Insurance Exchange, (D.C. La. 1957)
148 F. Supp. 915, affd. per curiam 355 U.S. 22 (1957). For discussion of the meaning of
"regulated by state law" as used in §2 (b), see Kimball and Boyce, "The Adequacy of
State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective,"
56 MICH. L. REv. 545 at 566-576 (1958); Morris, "Meaning of Term 'Regulated by State
Law' in Public Law 15," A.B.A. PRoc., SECTION OF INSURANCE LAw 213 (1949). See also
Interim Report of the Sub-Committee on Federal Legislation of the Executive Committee
of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Gune 5, 1945), N.A.I.C. PROC. 156
at 159 (1945).
16 "This bill would permit - and I think it is fair to say that it is intended to permit rating bureaus. . . • I think that the insurance companies have convinced many members of the legislature that we cannot have open competition in fixing rates on insurance."
Statement of Senator Ferguson during the Senate debate on the McCarran Act, 91 CoNG.
REc. 1481 (1945).
17" ••• Congress granted the states and the industry a period of grace within which
to remove abuses, to revise old laws and to enact new ones. It further provided that at
the end of this period, the anti-trust laws would again apply to the business of insurance
'to the extent that such business is not regulated by state law.' Thus, to the extent that
restraints of trade in the insurance industry have not been removed by state regulation,
the anti-trust laws will provide the necessary corrective." Address of Manuel Gorman,
Assistant Attorney General, A.B.A. PROC., SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW 301 at 302-303
(1946).
18 It has been argued that mere token regulation will not meet the requirements of
the McCarran Act. Only adequate and effective regulation by the states will suffice.
See Kimball and Boyce, "The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective," 56 MICH L. REv. 545 at 566-576 (1958).
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intention that future state regulation must effectively ensure
price competition among insurers.19

B.

Reactions to the McCarran Act

In response to the congressional invitation implicit in the
McCarran Act, the Commissioners'-All-Industry Committee, composed of representatives of the National Association qf Insurance
Commissioners and various segments of the insurance industry,
met in 1946 for the purpose of drafting model bills which would
provide for positive state control of the rate-making process in
both fire and casualty insurance20 while preserving the competitive opportunities for those companies which did not wish to
subscribe to bureau rates. 21 The Commissioners'-All-Industry
Committee, after lengthy deliberation and extensive compromise
of conflicting views regarding the degree of state control required
by the McCarran Act, produced two model bills for submission
to the state legislatures-the Fire and Marine Rate Regulatory
Bill and the Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Bill.22 Both
19 "Nothing in this bill [the McCarran Act] is to be so construed as indicating it to
be the intent or desire of Congress to require or encourage the several states to enact legislation that would make it compulsory for any insurance company to become a member
of rating bureaus or charge uniform rates. It is the opinion of Congress that competitive
rates on a sound financial basis are in the public interest." H. Rep. 143, 79th Cong., 1st
sess. (1945).
20 Many people in the insurance industry were led to believe that cooperative ratemaking would not come within the aegis of the Sherman Act if such activities were supervised by the states. Support for this belief was found in the decision in Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943), which held the Sherman Act inapplicable to a state-controlled program regulating the price of raisins produced in California but destined for shipment in
interstate commerce. This belief was further bolstered by the informal statement made by
Attorney General Biddle on November 11, 1944, when he appeared before the Drafting
Committee of State Officials of the Council of State Governments: " •.. if a group of insurance companies agreed on rates and filed them with a state commission or state body,
and that body took active and definite action, made active and definite approval of
those rates, in that case I think the matter would not be involved at all in the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act." Quoted in Dineen, "The Rating Problem,'' A.B.A. PRoc., SECrION OF
INSURANCE LAW 104 at 105 (1945).
21 "In drafting these bills it was recognized that many companies desired to take independent action. It was recognized that uniformity while authorized should not be made
mandatory, thereby preserving freedom of action upon the part of those who desire to
take action independently." Report of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Rates and
Rating Organizations, National Association of Insurance Commissioners (May 22-23, 1946),
N.A.I.C. PROC. 261 at 367 (1946). For statements by the drafters having similar purport, see
N.A.I.C. PROC. 122-123 (1946). Cf. Joint Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation
and the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (December 5, 1945), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 94 at 100 (1946).
22 The complete evolution of these model bills can be traced in the various committee
reports which are reprinted in N.A.I.C. PROC. (1946). For purposes of this comment, reference will not be made to the individual bills. Unless otherwise indicated the cited
sections of the model bills are identical in each bill. However, although the problems
which will hereafter be discussed are pertinent to both fire and casualty insurance, they
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bills contained similar provisions and have since been enacted in
substantially their original form in almost all of the states.23
The basic standard imposed by the All-Industry Bills24 is
that the rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.25 Under the typical procedure all rate filings must
be submitted to the commissioner accompanied by the supporting
statistical data upon which the filer relies. 26 However, an individual insurer may satisfy the filing requirements by becoming
a member or subscriber of a rating bureau which has been licensed
by the commissioner.27 Since the rating bureau is authorized to
make filings on behalf of its members and subscribers, they are
generally bound by the bureau's filing, except that a filing by
an affiliated company for a uniform percentage deviation from
the bureau's rates is allowed. 28 Furthermore, each rating bureau
have thus far arisen only in connection with fire insurance. This may perhaps be explained by the fact that the rating bureau, both historically and at the present time,
has played a far more important role in the fire insurance lines. In casualty insurance,
particularly automobile liability, a large company may well be able to produce a statistically credible rate structure on the basis of its own experience, and consequently its rate
filings may not be as vulnerable to attack by competitors. ZoFFER, THE HISTORY OF AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE RATING 227-231 (1959).

23 Compilations of the various statutes may be found in Donovan, "Regulation of
Insurance Under the McCarran Act," 15 I.Aw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 473 at 485, n. 52 (1950),
and "Insurance Under the Commerce Clause -The First Decade," Report of Special
Subcommittee of Committee on Regulation of Insurance Companies, A.B.A. SECTION OF
INSURANCE I.Aw 10-13 (1954). Most of the existing statutes are products of the period
following the South-Eastern Underwriters case (1945-1948) and contain at least some
provisions of the model bills; it is difficult in some instances to determine whether they
are or are not based on the model bills. However, the following statutes, which either
require compulsory bureau membership or make no provision for rate filings, seem
clearly to depart from the philosophy of the model bills. Compulsory bureau membership:
D.C. Code (1951) §35.1404 (fire); La. Rev. Stat. (1950) §§1405, 1406 (fire and casualty);
Mass. Laws Ann. (1950) c. 175, §113B (motor vehicle); Miss. Code Ann. (1957) §5826
(fire); N.C. Gen. Stat. (Recomp. 1950) §58-127 (fire), §53-247 (motor vehicle); Tex. Civ.
Stat. (Vernon, 1952) art. 5.01 (motor vehicle), art. 5.25 (fire); Va. Code (1950) §38.1-227.
No rate filings required: Cal. Ins. Code Ann. (Deering, 1950) §§1850-1860.3 (fire and
casualty); Idaho Code (Supp. 1948) §41-3601 (casualty- as long as commissioner finds
that reasonable competition exists); Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1952) §§379.420 to 379.510
(casualty); Wash. Rev. Code §48.19. Independent companies are not required to file their
casualty rates in Montana. Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §40-2411.
24 Reference will frequently be made to the provisions of the All-Industry Bills. Unless the contrary is indicated, the reference is to the drafts of May 18, 1946, which will be
found in N.A.I.C. PRoc. 397-421 (1946), and 4 RICHARDS, INSURANCE, 5th ed., 2112, 2124
(1952).
25 Section 3 (a).
26 Section 4 (a).
27 Section 4 (b).
28 Section 7. Deviation provisions recognize the right of an insurer who is a member
or subscriber of a rating bureau to sell below the average level determined by the bureau
to the extent that the insurer can demonstrate that over a substantial period of time
its operating expenses have been lower than the average for all companies in the bureau.
Deviation filings, unlike dividends which represent retrospective price adjustments, apply
price reductions at the inception of the policy period.
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is required to permit any insurer to become a subscriber for
its rating services,29 although no individual company is required
to become a member or subscriber of a rating bureau.3 ° Consequently, any insurer may act independently of the rating bureau
by making its own rate filings directly with the commissioner; but
its filings, like those of the bureau, must conform to the statutory standards.31 Once an initial filing is made, the rates remain
on file for a period varying from 30 to 90 days before they become effective, during which time the commissioner is supposed
to consider the filing and its supporting information and either
approve or disapprove it.32 In a majority of the states which
followed the pattern of the All-Industry Bills rate filings not
specifically disapproved by the commissioner become effective
immediately after the expiration of the waiting period.33 HowSection 6 (b).
Section 4 (b). But cf. note 23 supra.
31 Section 3 (a) . An insurer may also subscribe for the services of the rating bureau
for some classes of insurance, while at the same time making its own independent filings
for other classes of the same type of insurance. The right of "partial subscribership"
has been upheld in Arizona [Pacific Fire Insurance Rating Bureau v. Insurance Co. of
North America, 83 Ariz. 369, 321 P. (2d) 1030 (1958)] and New York [Decision of Alfred
J. Bohlinger, Superintendent of Insurance, State of New York, In the matter of the Independent Fire Filing of the Insurance Co. of North America, for Dwelling Classes 009,
019, 029 and 011, September 14, 1954, affd. without opinion, Cullen v. Bohlinger, 284
App. Div. 963, 136 N.Y.S. (2d) 361 (1954), leave to appeal denied 308 N.Y. 1049, appeal
dismissed, 308 N.Y. 886, 126 N.E. (2d) 564 (1955), appeal dismissed 350 U.S. 803 (1955)],
and is pending in Washington [Insurance Co. of North America v. Sullivan, Supreme
Court of State of Washington, Docket No. 35042].
32 Section 4 (d). The model bills provided for an initial waiting period of 15 days
which could be extended by the commissioner for an additional 15-day period by giving
written notice to the insurer or rating bureau that made the filing. The waiting period
was intended to afford the commissioner a period in which to examine a rate filing and the
statistical information upon which it was based in order to determine whether it complied with the statutory standards set forth in §3 (a).
33 Section 4 (d) contains the so-called "deemer clause," which provides that a "filing
shall be deemed to meet the requirements of this Act unless disapproved by the (commissioner) within the waiting period or any extension thereof." The maximum period during
which the rates must be on file, which includes the initial waiting period and the allowable extension, before the "deemer clause" becomes operative, varies from 30 days under
the model bills to 90 days in New Jersey. The waiting period and "deemer clause" provisions have been included in fire and casualty rating laws in the following states: Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia (casualty only), Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho (fire only), Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas (fire only), Kentucky, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio (fire only), Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Utah, Vermont (casualty only), Virginia (casualty only), Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming (fire only). In a substantial group of states a proposed rate
becomes effective immediately upon filing subject only to the commissioner's power of
disapproval in the event he finds that at some subsequent time the filing no longer com•
plies with the rating law: Delaware (fire and casualty), District of Columbia (casualty),
Maine (fire and casualty), Massachusetts (fire and casualty), New Hampshire (fire and
casualty), Ohio (casualty), Texas (casualty other than motor vehicle), Vermont (fire and
casualty), Wyoming (casualty).
29
30
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ever, a substantial group of states require affirmative approval
before a rate filing can become effective. 34 The commissioner's
power to disapprove a rate filing, whether made by a rating bureau, a deviator, or an independent insurer, is not arbitrary; he
may not disapprove any filing if it complies with the statutory
rating standards.35
From this general description of the All-Industry pattern of
regulation, it would seem that opportunities for price competition have been adequately assured through the provisions allowing deviation and independent filings. However, a meaningful
evaluation of these opportunities is possible only after consideration of the practical administrative problems encountered by individual insurers in their efforts to compete on a price basis. In
this respect, the most substantial impediment to deviation and
independent filings has been the facility with which the rating
bureaus have been able to challenge them on the administrative
and judicial level.
I.

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BY COMPETITORS

A.

Deviation Filings

Section 7 of the All-Industry Bills recognizes the right of a
member or subscriber of a rating bureau to file with the commissioner a request for approval of a uniform percentage deviation from the rates filed by the rating bureau. 36 However, two
factors diminish the utility of the deviation filing as a vehicle for
strenuous competitive action. First, before the commissioner can
approve the deviation filing he must give notice to the rating
34 In the following states the rating laws purport to require approval by the commissioner before a rate filing can become effective: Alabama (fire and casualty), Florida
(fire and casualty), Kansas (casualty), Mississippi (casualty), New Hampshire (motor
vehicle), New Jersey (fire and casualty), North Carolina (casualty), Tennessee (fire and
casualty). Prior approval provisions are also found in statutes which prescribe compulsory
bureau membership. See note 23 supra. However, if the commissioner fails to approve
or disapprove the filing within some specified period, usually 30 days, the filing is deemed
to be approved. Therefore, these provisions appear quite similar in substance to those
of the model bills.
35 Section 5 (a).
36 In the absence of a deviation filing, a member or subscriber of a rating bureau
would be bound by the bureau's filing. Section 7. The drafters of the All-Industry
Bills recognized "that any insurance rate regulatory law which unduly restricts the desire
of a carrier to pass on a demonstrated economy to the insurance buyer is not in the
public interest." Report of the Sub-committee on Rates and Rating Organizations (May
22-23, 1946), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 361 at 370 (1946). The drafters also recognized that while
deviation filings are based, under ordinary circumstances, on demonstrated savings in
the expense portion of the premium dollar, under certain circumstances a more favorable
loss record of an individual company might justify a deviation filing. Ibid.
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bureau, which then has the right to be heard in opposition to
the granting of the deviation.37 The fact that some bureaus may
have a policy of challenging all deviation applications, or at
least all those which present a severe competitive threat,38 suggests that the danger of lengthy and expensive administrative
hearings, accompanied by the possibility of subsequent review
by the courts, makes the deviation filing a potentially burdensome
procedure for insurers who wish to compete with the bureau
companies on a price basis.39 Second, since a deviation filing is
operative for only one year, its effectiveness as a competitive measure is uncertain because the rating bureau, which has the right
to request annual hearings, may be able to prevent the company
from keeping its deviation in continuous effect.4 ° Furthermore,
the necessity of justifying a deviation filing each year imposes a
financial burden on the applicant which few small companies
can bear. The cumbersomeness of the deviation procedure and
the impossibility of obtaining and keeping deviations in effect
led one major fire insurance company to withdraw from the rating bureau and file its rates, at least for certain classes of risks,
independently.41

B.

Independent Filings

The All-Industry Bills do not require the comm1ss1oner to
hold a hearing before initially disposing of a rate filing. 42 Consequently, a rate filing cannot be challenged by a competitor at
87 Because the commissioner will have already approved the general rate schedule
filed by the bureau, which supposedly represents the best judgment of the "experts,"
the applicant will have the burden of establishing that its loss or expense experience
justifies the deviation. See Brook, "Public Interest and the Commissioners' -All-Industry
Laws," 15 LAW AND CONTEM. PROB. 606 at 613 (1950).
88 See "Competition in the Fire Insurance Business," Statement of W. Perry Epes,
given on behalf of the Insurance Company of North America, Insurance Industry Hearings,
p. 1151.
39See Brook, "Public Interest and the Commissioners'-All Industry Laws," 15 LAW
AND CoNTEM. PROB. 606 at 613 (1950).
40 See "Competition in the Fire Insurance Business," Statement of W. Perry Epes,
given on behalf of the Insurance Company of North America, Insurance Industry Hearings,
p. 1151.
41 See "Competition in the Fire Insurance Business," Statement of John A. Diemand,
given on behalf of the Insurance Company of North America, Insurance Industry Hearings,
p. 1121.
42 This conclusion is suggested by the failure of the model bills to provide specifically
for a hearing before the commissioner considers a filing. Furthermore, §4 (a) provides
that a "filing and supporting information shall be open to public inspection after the
filing becomes effective." If a filing is not open to public inspection before it becomes
effective a competitor would have no basis for challenging it. See Shield, "Some Procedural
and Administrative Questions Arising Under Laws Resulting From Public Law 15,"
A.B.A. PROC., SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW 233 at 235 (1949).
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this stage. If the commissioner disapproves the filing, either within the applicable review period43 or at some subsequent time,44
the filer, whether a rating bureau or an independent insurer, is
entitled to a hearing. If, however, the commissioner approves
an independent rate filing, the question arises whether a competing rating bureau or its affiliated companies have the right to
challenge the rate filing on the administrative level as not conforming to the statutory standards.
Although persons whose only interest in challenging administrative action was to avoid increased competition have been
denied standing in the absence of a statutory authorization, 45
where statutory provisions have purported to confer standing
on a class described as "aggrieved parties" some courts have found
the requisite standing to be present.46 Thus in FCC v. Sanders
Brothers Radio Station41 the issue was whether an existing broadcasting station which would suffer economic injury by increased
competition had standing to challenge the grant of a construction
permit to a new station. The applicable statute provided for an
appeal by "any person aggrieved or whose interests would be adversely affected. . . ." 48 The Supreme Court held that although
48 Section 16 (a) (fire bill); §17 (a) (casualty bill).
44 Section 5 (c), which gives the commissioner a continuing jurisdiction over all ratefilings, was designed to permit the commissioner's subsequent disapproval of a filing
which previously became effective by operation of the deemer clause [§4 (d); see note 33
supra], or one which met the requirements of the rating law at the time it was approved
but which subsequently failed to conform to the rating standards because of a change
in the statistical or economic picture. See Report of the Sub-committee of the Committee
on Rates and Rating Organizations (May 22-23, 1946), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 361 at 369 (1946).
Section 5 (c) provides: "If at any time subsequent to the applicable review period [the
initial waiting period] ••. , the (commissioner) finds that a filing does not meet the
requirements of this Act, he shall, after a hearing • • • , issue an order specifying in
what respects he finds that such filing fails to meet the requirements of this Act, and
stating when, within a reasonable period thereafter, such filing shall be deemed no longer
effective••••" See Cravey v. Southeastern Underwriters Assn., 214 Ga. 450, 105 S.E. (2d)
497 (1958). Under §5 (d) the commissioner's disapproval of the filing cannot be made
effective retroactively.
45 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., !HO U.S. 113 (1940); Tennessee Electric Power Co. v.
TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939). See, generally, 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §22.04 (1958).
46 FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Scripps-Howard
Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); FCC v. NBC (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943); Associated
Industries v. Ickes, (2d Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 694, dismissed as moot 320 U.S. 707 (1943);
Pacific Inland Tariff Bureau v. United States, (D.C. Ore. 1955) 129 F. Supp. 472. And
see American President Lines v. Federal Maritime Board, (D.C. D.C. 1953) 112 F. Supp.
346 (applying Federal Administrative Procedure Act). But d. Kansas City Power and
Light Co. v. McKay, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 225 F. (2d) 924, cert. den. 350 U.S. 884 (1955)
(applying Federal Administrative Procedure Act).
41309 U.S. 470 (1940).
48 Section 402 (b) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1093, 47 U.S.C.
(1958) §402 (b).
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the licensee had no legal right to be free from competition and
the purpose of the Communications Act was to protect the public, Congress intended to confer a right of review upon those
who might suffer economic injury as a result of the licensing of
new stations because they would be the only persons who would
have sufficient incentive to challenge the legality of the FCC's
order.
Unfortunately, the All-Industry Bills, though conferring standing upon a class described as "aggrieved," do not clearly indicate
whether the framers intended to include competitors of the
rate filer within this class. At least two sections of the bills bear
upon the problem:
"5 . . . (d) Any person or organization aggrieved with respect to any filing which is in effect may make written application to the (commissioner) for a hearing thereon, provided, however, that the insurer or rating organization that
made the filing shall not be authorized to proceed under this
subsection. If the (commissioner) shall find that the application is made in good faith, that the applicant would be so
aggrieved if his grounds are established, and that such grounds
otherwise justify holding such a hearing, he shall . . . after
receipt of such application, hold a hearing . . . upon . . .
written notice to the applicant and to every insurer and rating organization which made such filing."
"16 ... (a) Any insurer or rating organization aggrieved by
any order or decision of the (commissioner) made without a
hearing, may, within thirty days after notice of the order to
the insurer or organization~ make written request to the (commissioner) thereon. The (commissioner) shall hear such party or parties . . . and . . . shall affirm, reverse or modify his
previous action...." (Emphasis added.)
Since the rate filer whose filing is disapproved is not entitled to
demand a hearing under section 5 (d), it must proceed under
section 16 (a) in obtaining a hearing on the order made by the
commissioner without a hearing. Furthermore, the "insurer or
rating organization aggrieved" within the meaning of section
16 (a) appears to be one which, by the additional terms of that
section, has received "notice of the order." This can refer only
to the insurer or rating organization whose own filing has been
the subject of the adverse order made without a hearing; consequently, section 16 (a) cannot apply to competing insurers or rat-
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ing organizations which do not, and are not entitled to, receive
any "notice of the order" approving an independent rate filing. 49
On the other hand, the history of section 5 (d), which was intended to permit an appeal directly to the commissioner by one
who was attacking the validity of the entire filing,110 leaves doubt
as to who may initiate the appeal and secure a hearing. The initial
draft of the model bills prepared by the commissioners51 contained in section 4 (i) language which, as subsequently modified,
was ultimately included as section 5 (d) in the final drafts submitted to the state legislatures. In their limited reference to section 4 (i) the drafters implied that its function was to provide for
an appeal by the public to the commissioner in the event there
was dissatisfaction with a rate filing. 52 However, subsequent
history suggests that section 5 (d) was intended to have wider ap49 As thus interpreted, §16 (a) would be consistent with the constitutional requirement of a judicial-type hearing in the rate-making process. See Jordan v. American Eagle
Fire Ins. Co., (D.C. Cir. 1948) 169 F. (2d) 281, where 174 insurance companies doing
business in the District of Columbia sought to enjoin enforcement of a rate reduction
order issued by the Superintendent of Insurance, claiming the order was constitutionally
defective. The superintendent had held a hearing at which the companies were allowed
to submit oral and documentary proof, but the superintendent had refused to disclose
the evidence upon which his order was based. The court held that although due process
required a hearing at some stage in the rate-making process, this requirement was satisfied by interpreting the District of Columbia Rating Law [D.C. Code (Supp. VI, 1940)
§35-1403] as providing for de novo review in the district court. See note, 33 MINN. L. REv.
771 (1949). It would appear that where de novo review was not provided in the rating
law, the constitutional right to a hearing would have to be satisfied at the administrative
level. Since the drafters of the All-Industry Bills decided to leave the scope of judicial
review open to the respective states [Report of the Sub-committee of the Committee on
Rates and Rating Organizations (May 22-23, 1946), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 361 at 375 (1946)],
it may be inferred that they contemplated the possibility of review other than de novo
and consequently intended to establish a procedure consistent with maximum due process
requirements.
50 This conclusion is suggested by the following language in section 5 (d): "If, after
such hearing, the (commissioner) finds that the filing does not meet the requirements
of this act, he shall issue an order specifying in what respects he finds that such filing
does not meet the requirements of this act. •••" Emphasis added. Section 9, the so-called
"Appeal by Insured" section, was intended to apply to the situation where an individual
insured was dissatisfied with the manner in which the rate schedule was applied to him.
See Report of the Sub-committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations
(May 22-23, 1946), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 361 at 371 (1946), where the drafters stated that §9
"has a different purpose . • . from section 5 (d). That subsection enables any person
aggrieved to challenge the over-all propriety of any particular filing whereas this section
enables an assured to challenge 'the manner in which such rating system has been applied in connection with the insurance afforded him.' " See also Shield, "Some Procedural
and Administrative Questions Arising Under Laws Resulting From Public Law 15," A.B.A.
PROC., SECTION OF INSURANCE LAw 233 at 234-239 (1949).
51 The initial draft was dated October 24, 1945, and may be found in N.A.I.C.
PROC. 103-120 (1946).
52 "This section also enables the public to obtain a hearing first from the company
or rating organization which made the rate and thereafter from the commissioner in the
event there is dissatisfaction with the rate." N.A.I.C. PROC. 124 (1946). This comment
would appear to refer more appropriately to §9. See note 50 supra.
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plication. In the January 18, 1946, draft of the model bills prepared by the commissioners it was provided that any person or
organization aggrieved by the action of the commissioner with
respect to any filing might make written request to the commissioner for a hearing thereon.53 The All-Industry Committee's
draft, on the other hand, purported to limit the right to request
a hearing to an insurer, a rating organization or an insured person.54 The following statement by the drafters indicates an intent
to adopt the more expansive language suggested by the commissioners:
"Your Committee was of the opinion that the suggestion advanced by the All-Industry Committee resulted in too great
a restriction and that any aggrieved person should have the
right to request a Commissioner to grant a hearing."55
At any rate, section 5 (d) was intended at the very least to confer
the right to request a hearing on an insurer or a rating organization. Since the express language of section 5 (d) precludes the filing insurer or rating organization from proceeding under that
subsection, it would seem that the insurer or rating organization
· referred to by the drafters must have been a competitor of the
filer. Moreover, the drafters' final pronouncement before submission of the final draft of the model bills for the approval of
the membership of the NAIC contained the following comment
(hereafter referred to as the drafters' "final comment"):
"'Subsection (d) is designed to provide relief for any person
or organization aggrieved with respect to any filing. Complete machinery is established to deal with this problem. As
this draft now stands, the rating organization, the insurer,
the Commissioner and the buyer are all provided with the
means of dealing with any defect in the rate structure."56
Section 5 (c) gave the commissioner a continuing jurisdiction
over the rate structure with authority to act if at any time sub53 See Report of the Sub-committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations (April 23-26, 1946), N.A.I.C. PROC. 385 at 387-388 (1946).
54 See Report of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations (March 11-14,
1946), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 391 at 395 (1946); Report of the Sub-committee of the Committee
on Rates and Rating Organizations (April 23-26, 1946), N.A.I.C. PROC. 385 at 387-388
(1946).
55 Emphasis added. Report of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations
(March 11-14, 1946), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 391 at 395 (1946). See also Report of the Sub-committee
of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations (April 29-May 2, 1946), N.A.I.C.
PROC. 381 at 384 (1946).
56 Report of the Sub-committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations
(May 22-23, 1946), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 361 at 369 (1946).
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sequent to approval of a rate filing he found that the filing no
longer met the statutory standards,57 while presumably the buyer
who challenged the over-all propriety of the rate-filing could
proceed under section 5 (d).58 Since a competing rating organization or insurer cannot proceed under section 16 (a),5° and since
no other provision of the model bills would provide it with "the
means of dealing with any defect in the rate structure," the above
comment would be consistent with the drafters' previously expressed intention to include a competing rating organization or
insurer within the scope of the "aggrieved" party provision of
section 5 (d).
Although the preceding discussion of the pre-enactment materials relevant to section 5 (d) suggests that the drafters of the
model bills intended to recognize the standing of competitors,
the Superintendent of Insurance took a contrary view when the
issue arose recently in New York. 60 In refusing to recognize a
right in a competing rating bureau to request a hearing for the
purpose of challenging an independent rate filing, the superintendent interpreted the drafters' final comment as suggesting that
"the insurer" and "the rating organization" therein referred to
were the insurer or rating organization that made the filing, thus
assuming that a member of the insured public would be the only
"person ... aggrieved" entitled to request a hearing under section
5 (d). Since section 5 (d) requires that the commissioner give notice
to the applicant and to "every insurer and rating organization
which made such filing" before holding a hearing, the superintendent concluded that the final comment was limited to a declaration that at the hearing called under section 5(d), the rating organization, the insurer, the commissioner and the buyer would all be
provided with the means of dealing with any defect in the rate
structure. Furthermore, the superintendent thought it significant
57 Section 5 (c). See note 44 supra.
58 See Shields, "Some Procedural and

Administrative Questions Arising Under Laws
Resulting from Public Law 15," A.B.A. PROC., SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW 233 at 237 (1949).
1!9 See text at note 49 supra.
60 Decision of Alfred J. Bohlinger, Superintendent of Insurance, State of New York,
In the Matter of Petition.of New York Fire Insurance Rating Organization and Eight
Individual Members for a Hearing Relating to the Fire Dwelling Rate Filings of the
Allstate Insurance Company, January 27, 1955. The facts of this case are discussed fully
in the text at notes 73-75 infra. In 1956 an amendment to the New York Insurance Law
was proposed which would have recognized a competing rating organization or insurer as an
aggrieved party within the meaning of §5 (d). [27 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940)
§186 (3)]. See Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regulation, State of New York, Legislative Doc. No. 40 at p. 12 (1956). This amendment was
not adopted.
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that the drafters' final comment referred to "the rating organization" and "the insurer," meaning the rate filer, rather than to "a
rating organization" and "an insurer."
The superintendent assumed that the drafters' final comment
referred exclusively to the rights under section 5 (d) of the parties
designated in the comment. His decision could also be supported
by assuming that the comment referred to the rights of the designated parties under all of the relevant provisions of the model
bills. Since the commissioner's authorization to deal with a
defect in the rate structure rests on section 5 (c), the use of the
word "draft" in the final comment could refer to the final drafts
of the entire model bills, rather than to the final draft of section
5 (d). From this premise it can be argued that the drafters' statement may only express their understanding that each bill as a
whole provided machinery by which the commissioner, the insured,
the insurer and the rating organization could deal ·with a defect
in the rate structure. The commissioner is entitled to proceed
under section 5 (c), while the members of the insured public may
presumably rely on section 5 (d), either individually or as represented by an "organization" of insureds. Consequently, the reference in the drafters' final comment to "the insurer" and "the
rating organization" could comprehend the right of the filer to
deal with an alleged defect in the rate structure by appearing at
the proceeding initiated by the member of the insured public at
which the over-all propriety of the rate filing is challenged, or it
could merely refer to the filer's right under section 16 (a). Furthermore, section 16 (a), which was clearly intended to recognize the
right of a rating organization to request a hearing, although limited
to the rating organization which made the filing, is phrased in
terms of "any insurer or rating organization aggrieved." On the
other hand, section 5 (d), which describes the class entitled to a
hearing in terms of "any person or organization aggrieved," suggests, by omission of the word "rating," that what was contemplated was an organization of insureds, not a rating organization. 61
Similarly, the use of the word "person" in section 5 (d), rather than
the word "insurer," as in section 16 (a), tends to suggest that only
members of the insured public were contemplated within the
meaning of section 5 (d).
61 Since §5 (d) refers to "any person or organization aggrieved" it might be argued
that the use of the word "organization" in denoting the class of persons entitled to standing establishes the drafters' intention to confer this right upon a competing rating organization. However, it would be consistent with the interpretation now being advanced to
argue that "organization" refers to a group of insureds, rather than to a rating organization.
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That a member of the insured public should be the only
person qualified as a "person . . . aggrieved" under section 5 (d)
is suggested by the fact that insurance rate regulatory laws are
enacted primarily for the benefit and protection of the insured
public, not for the benefit of competitors. Consequently, it would
not have been illogical for the drafters of the model bills to have
limited the right to challenge the over-all validity of a rate filing
made pursuant to the rating law to a member of the insured
public. Presumably, a member of the insured public would be
aggrieved by a rate filing when he was insured by the insurer who
made the filing and the filing was so inadequate as to jeopardize
the solvency of the filer.
Either of the above lines of reasoning, if accepted, would
provide a reasonable basis for concluding that the drafters' final
comment with reference to section 5 (d) conflicts with their earlier
statement which ostensibly indicated an intention to include
competitors within the class of persons or organizations entitled
to request a hearing. However, the failure of the superintendent
to consider the earlier comment detracts from the cogency of this
conclusion, and the alternative line of reasoning is open to the
same objection. Regardless of whether the history of section 5 (d)
is interpreted as indicating the drafters' apparent intention to
recognize the standing of competitors, the writer, after careful
review of all pre-enactment materials, cannot avoid the conclusion
that the problem of a competitor's right to request a hearing on
an independent filing was not even contemplated by the drafters. 62
The absence of a clearly-articulated recognition of the problem is
no doubt attributable to the understandable failure of the drafters,
because of the limited experience with independent filings prior
to the All-Industry Bills, 63 to appreciate fully the possible implications of the regulatory pattern which they were creating.
62 The writer assumes that if the question had arisen the independents who participated in the drafting of the model bills would, in view of their efforts to obtain as
much freedom from bureau restraints as possible, have voiced their objections, and that
these would have been reported in the various committee reports or in the trade journals.
The complete absence, however, of any reference to a dispute of this nature leads the
writer to believe that the problem was not envisioned at the time.
63 It is doubtful whether independent filings were possible at all prior to the enactment of the model bills. At this time, rating bureaus were not required to provide their
services to all takers, and if the allegations in the South-Eastern Underwriters case typify
bureau operations during this early period, _it is doubtful whether an _individual company could have filed independently for those classes as to which its own experience would
have been adequate without encountering bureau refusal to supply rating services for
those classes as to which no single company could make its own rates. See note 31 supra.
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Regardless of whether an ambiguity is found to exist or it is
concluded that section 5 (d) clearly does confer standing on competitors, it seems appropriate now to examine the policy considerations underlying the All-Industry pattern of regulation. If an
ambiguity is present, the policy factors thus isolated will be relevant to its resolution. However, if it is concluded that section
5 (d) clearly recognizes the standing of competitors to challenge
an independent rate filing, an understanding of the competing
policy considerations will provide a basis for assessing the desirability of such a statutory provision.
II.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The question of standing involves a determination of what
interests are deserving of legal protection. 64 In the context of
insurance rate regulation two broad public policies demand recognition and require reconciliation: 65 (1) regulation must produce
adequate rates which will assure the solvency of the insurance
enterprise; 66 and (2) regulation should promote a reasonable
degree of competition which will benefit the insured public
through lower rates, broader coverages and better service. The
drafters of the All-Industry Bills, who were familiar with the
practices condemned by the Supreme Court in the South-Eastern
Underwriters case and the congressional motives which prompted
the McCarran Act, based their entire legislative program on the
principle that the maintenance of competitive rates in the insurance business, to the extent consistent with company solvency, was
not only in the public interest, but was required by the McCarran
Act as a condition for the continued exemption of the business
of insurance from the federal antitrust laws. 67 Furthermore, the
64 See 3 DAVIS, .ADllllNISTRATIVE LAW §22.04 (1958).
65 Two additional objectives of rate regulation,

that the rates be neither excessive
nor discriminatory between insureds presenting substantially similar risks, do not appear
relevant to the present discussion.
66 For a discussion of the reasons for regulating insurance rates which emphasizes the
solvency factor, see Marryott, "Why Regulate Insurance Rates," A.B.A. PRoc., SECTION OF
INSURANCE LAW 305 (1946),
67 " ••• we recognize that Congress in enacting .•• Public Law No. 15 did so upon
the understanding that in some phases of the insurance business action in concert through
rating bureaus may serve a useful public purpose; the Congressional debates prior to the
enactment of ••. Public Law No. 15 amply establish that fact. This committee has pro•
ceeded upon the assumption that it was the intent of Congress that provision should be
made in the State regulatory structure for companies acting individually and for companies
action [sic] in concert; consequently, we have concluded to embody in our proposed drafts a
declaration of principle to that effect in the hope that it will serve as a continuing re•
minder to the State insurance administrators charged with enforcing the law to recognize
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"purpose clause" of the All-Industry Bills makes it manifest that
they were intended to encourage reasonable price competition. 68
The numerous provisions in the All-Industry Bills designed to
foster independent competitive action point to the same conclusion. 69
Recognition of the standing of competitors to challenge independent rate filings would undoubtedly diminish the utility of the
independent filings as a vehicle for competitive action by creating
a potential power in competitors to obstruct or impair the exercise
of initiative by individual companies. An insurer contemplating
an independent competitive filing would have to give careful
consideration not only to the merits of its rate filing but also to
the substantial expense which might result from lengthy administrative hearings and potential court appeals. Furthermore, although
a rate filing may become effective without affirmative approval by
the commissioner after being on file for a specified period of time,70
in practice a filing is made only after a course of consultation
between the filer and the commissioner in which the latter indicates
the extent to which a particular filing will be acceptable. 71 Hence,
if competitors are permitted to challenge a filing, the independent
filer would also have to consider that the value of expenditures
and commitments made in reliance upon the commissioner's prethe proper spheres of both types of operation." Joint Report of the Committee on Federal
Legislation and the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (December 5, 1945), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 94 at 99 (1946).
68 Section 1 of the model bills provides, inter alia: "Nothing in this act is intended
(1) to prohibit or discourage reasonable competition, or (2) to prohibit, or encourage
except to the extent necessary to accomplish the aforementioned purpose, uniformity in
insurance rates, rating systems, rating plans or practices. This article shall be liberally
interpreted to carry into effect the provisions of this section." The drafters further stated
that the "purpose clause ••• was employed to make abundantly plain that there should
be ample room for initiative in the development of new ideas in the insurance business
under rate regulatory statutes, and that while companies had the privilege of following
the patterns set by others, they were by no means obligated to do so and had complete
freedom to make patterns of their own within the framework of the law." N.A.I.C. PRoc.
397 (1946). See also Report of the Sub-committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating
Organizations (May 22-23, 1946), N.A.I.C. PROC. 361 at 366 (1946). Cf. Report of the Joint
Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regulations, State of New York, Legislative Doc. No. 46 at p. 54 (1948).
69 E.g., independent rate filings are allowed; affiliation with a rating bureau is not
required; deviations from bureau rates are permitted; rating bureaus must permit all
authorized insurers to subscribe to their services; all material data on rates are to be
matters of public record and open to public inspection for the use of independents as
well as rating bureaus; and the commissioner is given continuing supervision over the
internal affairs of the rating bureau at the request of an individual member or subscriber
who is not satisfied with the bureau's action with respect to a rate filing.
70 Section 4 (d). But see note 34 supra.
71 See Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regulation,
State of New York, Legislative Doc. No. 46 at 72-73 (1948).
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vious assurance of approval7 2 may be jeopardized by the opportunity of its competitors to re-open the question of the validity
of the filing.
On the other hand, the interest of the insured public in preserving company solvency through adequate rates is apparent. The
position of a competing rating bureau and its affiliated companies
is also entitled to consideration. If the independent filing approved
by the commissioner is in fact-inadequate, members and subscribers
of the rating bureau are subjected to unfair competition since both
bureau and deviation filings must conform to the statutory stand~rds. Therefore, if section 5 (d) is interpreted as affording a right
to a hearing only to an insured person or organization of insureds,
the rating bureau and its affiliated companies are left without a
means of remedying the situation. Moreover, it is unlikely that
any member of the insured public would have sufficient financial
incentive to assert his rights.
The problem of resolving these conflicting interests arose
recently in New York when the New York Fire Insurance Rating
Organization (NYFIRO) and eight of its member companies
petitioned the New York Insurance Department for a hearing on
a rate filing for dwelling classes filed by the Allstate Insurance
Company which was 20 percent below the bureau rates. 73 A hearing
was initially called in response to the petition, but it was terminated
upon motion by Allstate on the ground that neither NYFIRO
nor its member companies were aggrieved within the meaning
of the applicable provisions of the New York Insurance Law.74
72 In connection with a new rate filing an insurer must distribute the rating informa•
tion in the form of manuals to all of its agents and brokers so that the new rates can
be passed on to the public. Consequently, an insurer would not incur the expenses of
printing and distribution without first obtaining approval of the new rate schedules
in advance of actual filing.
73 NYFIRO alleged that the Allstate filing was inadequate, unreasonable and un•
fairly discriminatory because Allstate had no previous experience for these classes in the
state. Allstate had based its filing on a combination of two factors: (1) the loss element
included in the NYFIRO filing for dwelling classes; and (2) an expense element based on
a projection of its expenses attributable to automobile insurance (which it had written
in New York since 1932) to its anticipated fire insurance business. NYFIRO further
alleged upon information and belief that the Allstate filing would produce an under•
writing loss if made on behalf of the bureau or its members or subscribers, that it was
made solely for the purpose of giving Allstate an unfair competitive advantage, and that
Allstate was subsidized by its parent, Sears, Roebuck &: Company, in a manner not permitted by the New York Insurance Law.
74 27 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940) §186 (3) and 186-b. Although the language
of these provisions differs slightly from that of §§5 (d) and 16 (a) of the model bills, the
commissioner treated them similarly in view of the legislative purpose to incorporate
"those basic provisions set forth in the model rating biils not found in the New York
law.•••" New York Insurance Department, 88th Preliminary Report of ·the Superintendent of Insurance to the 1947 Legislature, p. 9. See Decision of Alfred J. Bohlinger,
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Subsequently, the Superintendent of Insurance, in a written
opinion,75 affirmed the previous dismissal on the grounds that
"(I) it would be inconsistent with the general purposes
of the model bill and the New York amendments to permit a
rating organization and its affiliated companies to intervene
in a proceeding involving an independent rate filing, since
such intervention would have the effect of a restraint on competition in pricing practices of their competitor, and (2) the
specific provisions of the model'bill and the New York amendments do not intend that such rating organization and its
affiliated companies shall have the standing of an aggrieved
party so as to entitle them to a hearing before the ... Superintendent of Insurance with respect to an independent filing
of rates of a competitor." 76
On the other hand, in National Capital Ins. Co. v. ]ordan,11
the court, relying on FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station18 and
cases which extended its rationale,79 held that a competing insurance company did have standing to challenge the validity of
Superintendent of Insurance, State of New York, In the Matter of Petition of New York
Fire Insurance Rating Organization and Eight Individual Members for a Hearing Re•
Iating to the Fire Dwelling Rate Filings of the Allstate Insurance Company, January
27, 1955, at 16.
75 Decision of Alfred J. Bohlinger, Superintendent of Insurance, State of New York,
note 74 supra. The issue was held moot on appeal. Cullen v. Holz, 2 Misc. (2d) 486, 152
N.Y.S. (2d) 163 (1956), affd. 7 App. Div. (2d) 718, 181 N.Y.S. (2d) 163 (1959), leave to
appeal den. 7 App. Div. (2d) 841, 182 N.Y.S. (2d) 324 (1959).
76 In a letter dated March 3, 1955, NYFIRO requested the new superintendent, who
had since succeeded Superintendent Bohlinger, to commence hearings on the Allstate
filing on his own initiative as provided by §186 (3) of the New York Insurance Law. On
rehearing the Allstate filing was approved, but at a level for dwelling classes which was
approximately 15% below the NYFIRO rates. Decision of Leffert Holtz, Superintendent
o{ Insurance, State of New York, In the Matter of Independent Filing of Fire Rates by
Allstate Insurance Company on Initiative of Hon. Leffert Holz, Superintendent of Insurance, July 1, 1955, affd. sub nom. Cullen v. Holz, 7 App. Div. (2d) 718, 181 N.Y .S. (2d)
163 (1959), affd. 6 N.Y. (2d) 971, 161 N.E. (2d) 392 (1959). However, in so holding
the appellate division concluded in a memorandum opinion that NYFIRO and its member companies were aggrieved parties, despite the fact that the hearing at which they
appeared had been called by the superintendent upon his own initiative after an announcement that the hearing was not to be considered an adversary proceeding. This
latter case may perhaps be distinguished from the situation where the competitior seeks
to initiate administrative action by requesting a hearing in its own right on the ground
that once a competitor is permitted to appear before the administrative agency it acquires
sufficient standing to challenge the administrative determination in the courts. Compare Matter of Bullis v. DuMond, 274 App. Div. 951, 83 N.Y.S. (2d) 452 (1948), affd. 276
App. Div. 882, 93 N.Y.S. (2d) 779 (1949), with Matter of Dairymen's League Co-Operative
Assn. v. DuMond, 282 App. Div. 69, 121 N.Y.S. (2d) 857 (1953), app. dismissed 306 N.Y.
595, 115 N.E. (2d) 825 (1953).
77 (D.C. D.C. 1957) 148 F. Supp. 317.
78 309 U.S. 470 (1940). See text at note 47 supra.
79 Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942)~ Associated Industries v. Ickes,
(2d Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 694, dismissed as moot 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
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an order of the Superintendent of Insurance approving a deviation
filing. The court, though presented- with a statute not of the
All-Industry type,80 did not purport to rest its decision on this
distinction, but was unable to attribute to the legislature a construction of the rating law which would leave competing insurance
companies "without statutory right of redress against capricious,
arbitrary, or unwarranted acts of the Superintendent, however
flagrant, in connection with deviation application ...." 81
It would also be possible to predicate standing on the doctrine
of "private attorneys general" enunciated by a series of Supreme
Court cases.82 Since few members of the insured public would
have sufficient incentive to inspect an independent filing to determine its conformity with the rating standards, it could be
argued that a competitor of the filer should have standing to
challenge the validity of an independent filing as a representative
asserting the rights of the insured public.83 On the other hand,
it can be argued that the Commissioner of Insurance, who is the
executive officer to whom the responsibility for administering
the rating law has been delegated, is an adequate representative
of the public interest.84 As head of a specialized department he is
so D.C. Code (1951) §§35-1401 to 35-1409, though requiring that all insurance companies authorized to do business in the District become members of the rating bureau,
recognizes that a company may deviate from the rates promulgated by the bureau after
filing the deviation with the bureau and the superintendent, and securing the latter's
approval. Provision is made for an appeal to any court of competent jurisdiction by
"any person aggrieved" from any order, ruling, proceeding or action of the superintendent.
81148 F. Supp. 317 at 320.
·
82Thus, in Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 at 14-15 (1942), the Court, in
explaining the Sanders case, stated: " . . . these private litigants have standing only as
representatives of the public interest. . . . That a court is called upon to enforce public
rights and not the interests of private property does not diminish its power to protect
such rights. . . . [T]he rights to be vindicated are those of the public and not of the
private litigants." See also FCC v. NBC (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943); Associated Industries
v. Ickes, (2d Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 694, dismissed as moot 320 U.S. 707 (1943). See, generally, 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §22.05 (1958).
83 In Sanders Brothers Radio Station v. FCC, 309 U.S. 470 at 477 (1940), the Court,
in recognizing the competitor's standing, stated: "Congress ... may have been of opinion
that one likely to be financially injured by the issue of a license would be the only person
having a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of law
in the action of the Commission in granting the license."
84 In American Surety Co. v. Jones, 384 Ill. 222, 51 N.E. (2d) 122 (1943), the court
held that insurance companies authorized to do business in Illinois had no standing, under
an "aggrieved party" provision, to challenge an order of the Director of Insurance granting a renewal license to a Lloyds insurer. "The Director of Insurance is an executive
officer of the State and his acts as such officer are final and will not ordinarily be disturbed by the courts. The Illinois Insurance Code provides standards which must be met
by every company seeking a certificate of authority to do business in Illinois. It is the
duty of the Director to see that those standards are met before such a certificate is issued
or renewed by him. Courts cannot assume to perform the duties and powers vested in the
Director, nor to determine whether or not he has acted wisely. If the Director fails
in the performance of his duty he is in the same position as any other public official who

1960]

COMMENTS

751

under a duty to see that the standards of the rating law have been
met before approving a rate filing, and his decision is entitled to
great weight. Consequently, in view of the countervailing policy
of promoting reasonable competition in the insurance business,
it may be desirable to restrict the reviewability of his decision
approving an independent filing to those to whom the legislature
has clearly granted that right.
CONCLUSION

The policy of promoting reasonable competition in the insurance business contemplates lower rates by forcing companies to
operate in a more efficient and economical manner. If insurance
companies are able by collaborative action and dilatory and harassing tactics to prevent competitive activity, the public interest
will not be served. Furthermore, since the South-Eastern Underwriters case the Federal Government's plenary power over the
business of insurance has not been questioned. Consequently,
if the respective states fail to provide the regulatory climate
conducive to "competitive rates on a sound financial basis" which
was contemplated by the McCarran Act, the threat of federal
intervention in the regulation of the insurance business may become more real than imaginary. 85 Where the standing of a rating
bureau or competing insurer to challenge an independent filing is
recognized, the situation is pregnant with possibilities of abuse.
Litigation instigated by combinations of competitors is easily
improperly exercises the power given him by statute." 384 Ill. 222 at 231-232, 51 N.E.
(2d) 122 (1943). Cf. City of New York v. New York Tel. Co., 261 U.S. 312 (1923); Matter
of Dairymen's League Co-Operative Assn. v. DuMond, 282 App. Div. 69 at 74, 121 N.Y.S.
(2d) 857 (1953), app. dismissed 306 N.Y. 595, 115 N.E. (2d) 825 (1953).
85 The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, acting at the request of
Senator O'Mahoney which followed hearings on aviation insurance held du~ing the summer of 1958, recently convened a Federal Grand Jury in New York to investigate alleged
antitrust law violations in the aviation underwriting field. See JOURNAL OF COMMERCE,
Jan. 20, 1960, p. 1: 4. In response to the recent hearings held before the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
has established a special subcommittee [The Subcommittee to Review Fire and Casualty
Rating Laws and Regulations] to study and evaluate present rating laws "with particular
reference to various items which have at one time or another been aired and were in fact
studied by the U.S. Senate anti-trust and monopoly sub-committee.'' See THE NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER, Nov. 20, 1959, p. I. The following statement by Vestal Lemmon, representing the National Association of Independent Insurers, illustrates quite clearly the position
of the independents with regard to the "aggrieved party" provisions of the model bills:
"To make it unmistakably clear that it is the insurance departments and not private
interests who are actually regulating our business, we believe the NAIC should take a
firm stand in opposition to recoguition of any right in one segment of the industry to
obstruct rate filings of their competitors in hearings and litigation." THE NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER, Nov. 27, 1959, p. 29.
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susceptible of misuse for the purposes of harassing the independent filer and frustrating its efforts to pass on price savings to the
insured public. On the other hand, both the insured public and
the competitors of the independent are vitally interested in making
certain that competition, if it exists, is on a sound financial basis.
Where regulation of insurance rates is truly effective and is of
the quality contemplated by the sponsors of the McCarran Actwhere the Commissioner of Insurance has a competent and welltrained staff capable of scrutinizing the rate filings of independent
companies, and has the time to do so-the commissioner can, in
fact, be said to represent the public interest adequately. It can
reasonably be presumed that he has given careful consideration
to the independent rate filing. In this situation the interests of
the rating bureau or other competitors in making certain that
the independent filing satisfies the statutory standards would appear subordinate to the policy of promoting reasonable competition. But where the commissioner, either through insufficient
funds, inadequately trained staff, or lack of time, is unable to
give careful consideration to an independent rate filing8 6 which
becomes effective automatically by virtue of a "deemer clause,"
it may be sound policy to allow the rating bureau to :challenge
the independent filing as a representative of its own and the public
interest.87
It is suggested that the problems involved in securing judicial
resolution of the competing policy considerations indicate the
desirability of an ad hoc legislative reappraisal of the effectiveness
of rate regulation in the various states. The determination whether
the present regulatory scheme, as actually administered, adequately
86 Kimball and Boyce, "The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The
McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective," 56 MICH. L. R.Ev. 545 at 556-565 (1958),
suggest that while in some states rate regulation is adequate and complete, in a substantial number a systematic and constant surveillance over rates is lacking. For a thorough
analysis of the adequacy of insurance rate regulation in a smaller state, see Kimball and
Hansen, "The Utah Insurance Commissioner: A Study of Administrative Regulation in
Action,'' 5 UTAH L. R.Ev. 429 at 440-449 (1957), 6 id. 1 at 17-22 (1958). A similar study
of the Montana Insurance Department is as yet unpublished: Kimball and Conklin, "The
Montana Insurance Commissioner: A Study of Administrative Regulation in Action." Cf.
KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND Ptrauc PouCY, c. 3, §4 (to be published by the Univ. of Wis.
Press in 1960).
87 The preceding discussion of policy considerations is obviously applicable to deviation filings and raises the further question whether the restrictions on the utility of
the deviation filing found in the model bills [see text at notes 37-40 supra] are justified
in view of their stated objectives to promote competition and encourage the exercise
of initiative by individual companies. Compare text at notes 37-40 supra with notes 36
and 68 supra.
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assures competitive opportunity consistent with protection of the
public interest is essentially one for the legislature, not the courts.
Thus, where the commissioner adequately represents the public
interest, the legislature should not recognize the standing of competitors to challenge independent rate filings; but where the legislative evaluation discloses that the commissioner is unable to
protect the public from the danger of inadequate rate filings a
statutory provision recognizing the standing of competitors under
section 5 (d) may be justified. In the latter situation, the responsibility for preserving competitive opportunity will rest with the
commissioner and will depend upon his right to require competitors to comply with the "good faith" requirements of section 5 (d).
If, however, a legislature chooses the latter alternative, it must
understand that the recognition of the standing of competitors is
but a temporary ameliorative which is justified only by the present
state of inadequate regulation. Such a choice will not absolve the
legislature from its affirmative obligation under the McCarran
Act to provide adequate and effective regulation as a condition
of continued exemption of the business of insurance from the
federal antitrust laws.
Joel N. Simon, S. Ed.

